"What this case is about is B.K. Johnson thought his money was his. His daughters thought his money was theirs,"

Family's big-bucks feud now in court

Web Posted: 03/29/2007 11:42 PM CDT

Elizabeth Allen
Express-News Belton Kleberg Johnson was many things, most of them big. He was a big man from a big ranch and he has a big family fighting over a big fortune.

And it's going to be a big trial.

The children of B.K. Johnson, who was known as B, are suing his widow, Laura McAllister Johnson, contending she took advantage of a man 20 years her senior, emotionally needy, incredibly rich and alcoholically enfeebled.

They want a jury to decide B wasn't in his right mind when he rewrote his will to give half his estate in trust to his wife and the other half to charity, leaving them out. The estate has been estimated at $40 million.

Calling Laura Johnson a "self-described canny Scotswoman," lawyers for B's children said they'll demonstrate how Johnson, along with lawyers and estate consultants, influenced B to leave his descendants out of the will before he died in 2001 at the age of 71.

Laura Johnson's lawyers, as well as lawyers for the trust and lawyers for the bank that handled the business, argue in turn that B gave his kids plenty in life, that despite his battles with alcohol he knew what he was doing. And, they add, they'll show his will was but a small piece of B's extensive estate planning that set up his children and grandchildren with millions in direct funds and trusts.

"What this case is about is B.K. Johnson thought his money was his. His daughters thought his money was theirs," said Barry McClenahan, Laura Johnson's lawyer.

The trial in Judge Polly Jackson Spencer's Bexar County Probate Court 1 began this week. It may take three months.

B inherited millions as the great-grandson of King Ranch founder Richard King. Lawyers on both sides presented his life in opening statements as a mix of privilege and struggle.

He grew up riding and working cattle on the King Ranch. His mother taught him to hunt, something he'd love most of the rest of his life. He lost his father when he was still a baby, and his mother died in an alcohol-related car accident when he was about 12.

Johnson was a hard drinker himself. When he was passed over in his hopes to run the ranch after his uncle's death, B sold his interest in it for about $70 million. Later he sued the family over that agreement and won a couple million more.

So it should have been no surprise when his own children sued him over his sale of their family ranch, Chaparrosa, as he fought against bankruptcy in the 1980s, said lawyers for the daughters. They were standing up for what was right just as he did, lawyer Jack W. Lawter Jr. said.

B had his children, two daughters and a son, with his first wife, Patsy. Lawter said growing up with B was an emotional roller coaster and that they could tell when an alcohol binge was coming. They even had a name for the prelude. They called it "getting spun up," he said.

Through it all, "B Johnson was crazy in love with his kids," Lawter said, "and they were crazy in love with him."

"As far as this case is concerned, the surest way to say 'I love you' is to leave your estate to your kids," he said.

The marriage to Patsy ended in divorce in 1987. In 1990, B married Lynne Murray, the same year he entered the Mayo Clinic for alcohol addiction, where he stated he long had been a heavy drinker, often consuming up to a quart of vodka a day, Lawter said.

At the Mayo Clinic, doctors determined he had damaged his brain with alcohol, Lawter said.

Just days after Lynne's death from breast cancer four years later, B was traveling to Australia to see her family and stopped over in Hong Kong, where he went to a pub called Mad Dogs and thought it might transfer well to his property in San Antonio, the Hyatt Regency Hotel on the River Walk.

And it did. The pub still operates today. But in his negotiations with the owner, Laura McAllister, then married, B became intrigued with her and soon began courting her, marrying the animal rights activist in 1996.

Shortly thereafter, B essentially gave up hunting.

"That right there shows you Laura was in control," lawyer Jim Hartnett said, displaying a slide for jurors titled "The Great Hunter is Caged."

Daughters Sarah Johnson Pitt and Cecilia Johnson McMurrey and daughter-in-law Cecilia Johnson Hager, and the eight children among them, filed this lawsuit in 2003.

Pointing to the Mayo Clinic tests, the family's lawyers contend that after 1990, B wasn't competent to make a will.

But lawyers for Johnson, the trust and bank maintain B was sharp enough to serve on boards of major companies for years and was deeply concerned with avoiding a heavy tax burden on his estate, as evidenced by multiple wills and estate plans over the years as his children grew up and had children and his own marital status changed.

And he even took his kids out of his will long before he met Laura, they noted.

A 1991 video will they intend to present to jurors will show B in his own words explaining that he'd left his kids out because he already had provided for them, they said.

"He never disinherited his family. His estate plan was not just his will. His estate plan was what he did throughout his entire life," McClenahan said.

---

eallen@express-news.net

Juror passes out as King Ranch probate trial opens

Web Posted: 03/29/2007 12:31 AM CDT

Elizabeth Allen
Express-News Bailiffs are more often called upon to subdue people than to revive them.

So when a juror passed out just a few minutes into a lawyer's opening statement Wednesday in the probate fight over B.K. Johnson's multimillion-dollar estate, the bailiff called for backup.

Lawyer Jack Lawter, representing Johnson's children and grandchildren in their lawsuit against his third wife, Laura McAllister Johnson, had just begun detailing a lifetime of heavy alcohol consumption by the man often referred to as B.

The juror gasped briefly and his head slipped back. Several people, including Bexar County Probate Court 1 Judge Polly Jackson Spencer, later remarked they at first thought he'd nodded off rather early in what's expected to be a long trial.

But an uneasy silence filled the courtroom as it became apparent the man was not sleeping.

"Bailiff," Spencer called, and the bailiff threaded through the tables and lawyers to get to the juror while calling a code into his radio. Several other bailiffs quickly arrived, and an ambulance was called.

The man revived without help after a few seconds and sat up, sweating and looking dazed. Another juror leaned forward, her hand on his shoulder, and asked him if he might have had a seizure, and whether he had a medical condition.

He shook his head and sat quietly until emergency medical personnel took him out on a stretcher. He later was reported to be in good condition. If he doesn't continue jury duty, there still would be 14 jurors, as three alternates were chosen for the trial.

Bailiffs are trained in CPR and emergency first aid, sheriff's Deputy Sgt. Larry Quintanilla said, and get a refresher course each year.

However, he said: "We cover ourselves by having EMS take over."

The delay was not the first in this prolonged struggle. B.K. Johnson, an heir to the King Ranch, died of cancer at 71 in 2001. He left his $40 million estate in trust to Laura Johnson, while bequeathing to his daughters and his son's widow his collection of vintage firearms, valued at about $75,000.

The children and their grandchildren filed the lawsuit in 2003. In recent months they reached a settlement, but that fell through and they ended up back in Probate Court 1, where lawyers once again will begin opening statements today.

---

eallen@express-news.net

As defined by your own words Solly, “(You) respect the 74th Legislature's policy decision”, Two Words, “Recalcitrant Person" were excluded

Kenedeno & Associates

Public Policy Advocates

Anton S Haley

4910 Lavaca

Corpus Christi, TX 78411

-------------------------------------

(361) 851-2851

March 18, 2007

Solomon P. Ortiz Jr.

P.O. Box 2910

Austin, TX 78768-2910

Dear State Rep Solomon Ortiz Jr.,

Thank you for your response to the issues with Section 25.093 of the Education Code. Truancy is indeed a serious concern for myself as a parent and for our community as a whole. If you remember it was a very heated issue during the Precinct chair election in which Kenedeno & Associates, in combination with your attributes and network that brought fairness and balance to the unleveled field. It was the written word that reached the precinct chairs. It was the written word that allowed them to become informed and make up their own minds. And it was the written word that provided the security and comfort zone to vote the way they felt was appropriate. The Miller issues revolved around this law and it was the Principal and his administrators who were blamed.

Unequivocally, when a parent places his child in the custody of a School Administration: The Parent requires the child to attend school if the child is present at beginning of the day!

TEXAS EDUCATION CODE Sec. 25.093 & 25.094 is derived from the TEXAS EDUCATION CODE Sec. 4.25. Thwarting Compulsory Attendance Law which stated,

(a) If any parent or person standing in parental relation to a child, within the compulsory school attendance ages and not lawfully exempt or properly excused from school attendance, fails to require such child to attend school for such periods as required by law, it shall be the duty of the proper attendance officer to warn, in writing, the parent or person standing in parental relation that attendance must be immediately required. If after this warning the parent or person standing in parental relation intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence fails to require the child to attend school as required by law, the parent or person standing in parental relation commits an offense. The attendance officer shall file a complaint against him in the county court, in the justice court of his resident precinct, or in the municipal court of the municipality in which he resides. An offense under this section is punishable by a fine of not less than $5 nor more than $25 for the first offense, not less than$10 nor more than $50 for the second offense, and not less than $25 nor more than $100 for a subsequent offense. Each day the child remains out of school after the warning has been given or the child ordered to school by the juvenile court may constitute a separate offense.

“If after this warning the parent or person standing in parental relation intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence fails to require the child to attend school as required by law, the parent or person standing in parental relation commits an offense”.

It appears in 1989, Section 4 of the Texas Education Code was amended (avoiding the public radar) into a idealistic “mission statement” rendering it a toothless but altruistic statement.

_{ch. 658 § 11, 1989 Tex Gen. Laws 2165, 2168, amending § 4.25, Education Code (Thwarting Compulsory Attendance Law)}

The incorporation of the Compulsory Attendance Law and the Thwarting thereof into Section 25 “Admission, Transfer and Attendance” excluded the “intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence” qualifier. Also, please take notice of the fine amounts clause “not less than $5 nor more than $25 for the first offense, not less than$10 nor more than $50 for the second offense, and not less than $25 nor more than $100 for a subsequent offense”.

An absent student is one who never arrives at school in the morning and is absent for the WHOLE Day. The student was never on campus. The Parent is responsible for the student getting to school (requiring the student to attend school). If the student does not get to school it is the Parent’s responsibility not necessarily the Parent’s fault. There are circumstances where the student will walk in the front door and out the back door without attending a single class. This is where the attendance officers need to improve their due diligence like the old days.

Once the student is counted present in the morning; the Parent has required the student (child) to attend school.

Once the student is verified in attendance at the beginning of the school day the student is in the custody of the School.

Is the Parent, by taking the child to school (and the child is accounted for as in attendance), “intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence failing to require the child to attend school”?

When the student is tardy or skips class (on campus or off campus) it is happening on the watch of the school. The Parent should cooperate and communicate with the School Counselors Administrators and the Attendance Officers to correct the behavior.

The Security and Attendance officers should take notice and tighten the belt. This is a security issue as well; there is no excuse for students coming and going outside of the lunch period and it is imperative that attendance irregularities be dealt with within 24 hours. This is easily done with our modern technology. Instead, what we are seeing is the Attendance Officers documenting the absences as they accumulate and filing on the Parent and student when the number of absences are achieved. (Like to meet a quota.)

Below are a few excerpts out of the legislation from the 74^th Legislature authored by Bill Ratliff

“7-23 (2) the unexcused voluntary absence of a child on 10

7-24 or more days or parts of days within a six-month period or three or

7-25 more days or parts of days within a four-week period from school

7-26 without the consent of his parents”;

That is called a permission slip where I went to school. The HD #33 State Rep and the South Texas Delegation need to do what is best for South Texas. Make a law like the

“5-11 (15)  "Status offender" means a child who is accused,

5-12 adjudicated, or convicted for conduct that would not, under state

5-13 law, be a crime if committed by an adult, including:

5-14 (A) truancy under Section”51.03(b)(2);”

“50-6 (d) 3)  the person <child> and the person's <child's>

50-7 parents, managing conservator, or guardian attend a class for

50-8 students at risk of dropping out of school designed for both the

50-9 person <child> and the person's <child's> parents, managing

50-10 conservator, or guardian;”

“(e)  An order under Subsection (d)(3) that requires the

50-22 parent, managing conservator, or guardian of a person to attend a

50-23 class for students at risk of dropping out of school <(d) of this

50-24 section> is enforceable in the justice court by contempt.”

“ 52-19 (2) the child's parents, managing conservator, or

52-20 guardian attend a parenting class or parental responsibility

52-21 program if the court finds the parent, managing conservator, or

52-22 guardian, by wilful act or omission, contributed to, caused, or

52-23 encouraged the child's conduct; or

52-24 (3) the child and the child's parents, managing

52-25 conservator, or guardian attend the child's school classes or

52-26 functions if the court finds the parent, managing conservator, or

52-27 guardian, by wilful act or omission, contributed to, caused, or

53-1 encouraged the child's conduct.”

“60-12 (g) On a finding by the court that a child's parents or

60-13 guardians have made a reasonable good faith effort to prevent the

60-14 child from engaging in delinquent conduct or engaging in conduct

60-15 indicating a need for supervision and that, despite the parents' or

60-16 guardians' efforts, the child continues to engage in such conduct,

60-17 the court shall waive any requirement for restitution that may be

60-18 imposed on a parent under this section.”

a reasonable good faith effort 

144-3 (2) the unexcused voluntary absence of the child on 10

144-4 or more days or parts of days within a six-month period or three or

144-5 more days or parts of days within a four-week period from school

144-6 without the consent of the child's parent, managing conservator, or

144-7 guardian;

145-17 (b)  A parent, managing conservator, guardian, or other

145-18 member of the child's household who violates a court order under

145-19 Section 264.305 by failing to participate in services provided by

145-20 the department is subject to contempt of court. The court may

145-21 under its contempt powers impose a community service requirement.”

Furthermore, 74R SB 1 was authored by Senator Ratliff; while the Sponsor was Sadler. In this legislation, the term Recalcitrant Person cogently replaced the “intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence failing to require the child to attend school” Parent.

“464-14 (7) <, or> to file a complaint against any

464-15 recalcitrant person having parental control as provided in Section

464-16 25.090; and

464-17 (8) <4.25 of this code, or> to file a complaint

464-18 against a student <pupil> for a violation of Section 25.091”

In response to your statement, “You say that you are doing everything you can to require your child to attend school and feel that you are being prosecuted unjustly”.

This is not about me Solly, I have the ability to defend myself and I will do so eloquently in a very public manner. I am presenting you with an unjust law, a law that injures many of your constituents and many of your esteemed colleague’s constituents as well. I am also providing you an insight as one who has attended public school and graduated from public school right here in Corpus Christi (CCISD).

However, the 74th Legislature decided that the best way to compel a child's attendance was to put pressure on the parent. While I understand the difficult and frustrating situation you are in, 1 also respect the 74th Legislature's policy decision and will not be filing any legislation regarding this issue at this time.

It is not the best way but the most expedient. As defined by your own words Solly, “(You) respect the 74th Legislature's policy decision”, it is requested that the cogent qualifier “Recalcitrant Person” be put back into the law.

As far as the JP Courts are concerned, an Attorney was consulted; the District Attorney; he has issued a directive to the JP’s consistent with the law. JP’s are not legally trained and have not the power to confine. Awaiting your response I remain.

Respectfully Always,

Anton S Haley

WHEN The State has not filed a reply brief AND the State's failure to file a brief IS TREATED as a confession of error.

• DID THE 13^TH COURT OF APPEALS ERR BY IT’S FAILURE TO CORRECTLY CONDUCT A HARM ANALYSIS?
• 
  
• WHEN CONDUCTING A HARM ANALYSIS, MUST AN APPELLATE COURT CONSIDER ALL THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD
• 
  
• WHEN The State has not filed a reply brief AND the State's failure to file a brief IS TREATED as a confession of error. Siverand v. State, 89 S.W.3d 216, 220 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) IS Siverand v. State IN CONFLICT WITH AN APPELLATE COURT CONSIDERING ALL THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD?
• 
  
• WHAT IS THE PROPER TEST FOR ANALYZING HARM WHEN CONSIDERING THE EFFECTS OF THE ERRONEOUS EXCLUSION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FIRMLY ROOTED IN TWC POLICY. RULES AND PRECEDENT?

The appropriate standard of harm is to disregard an error unless a substantial right has been affected. Tex. Rule App. P. 44.2(b). We have held that a substantial right is affected when the error has a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We adopted this language from the Supreme Court's holding in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1945). In Kotteakos, the Supreme Court explained:

If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the judgment should stand, except perhaps where the departure is from a constitutional norm or a specific command of Congress. But if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not affected. The inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to support the result, apart from the phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether the error itself had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand.

Id. at 764-65 (citation and footnote omitted).

We agree with the appellant that no burden to show harm should be placed on the defendant who appeals. In Ovalle v. State, 13 S.W.3d 774 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), we explained that "no party should have the burden to prove harm from an error, and there ordinarily is no way to prove 'actual' harm." Id. at 787. In that case we held that the appellant did not have the burden to prove harm in the context of jury charge error under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 36.19. Rather, it is the duty of the reviewing court to assess harm from the context of the error. Id. The rationale for the decision in that case was that determining the existence of harm from an error is not the same as proving facts at trial. Id. (citing Roger Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 25-26 (1970)). We explained that the parties may assist by suggesting how the appellant was harmed (or not), but it is the responsibility of the reviewing court to decide whether it is likely that the error had some adverse effect on the proceedings. Id. (quoting Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure 1165 (2d ed. 1992)).

The Supreme Court has adopted the same rule in the context of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a). Our harmless error rule is based on that federal rule. See Carranza v. State, 980 S.W.2d 653, 657 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Therefore we look to the Supreme Court for guidance in interpreting Rule 44.2(b).

The Supreme Court has explained that, in the federal system, it is the responsibility of the appellate court to determine whether a trial error affected the resulting judgment. In O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 437 (1995), the Court explained that there is a difference between a trial court's task of managing the admission of evidence and the reviewing court's task of applying a legal standard to a trial that is already complete.

As an initial matter, we note that we deliberately phrase the issue in this case in terms of a judge's grave doubt, instead of in terms of "burden of proof." The case before us does not involve a judge who shifts a "burden" to help control the presentation of evidence at a trial, but rather involves a judge who applies a legal standard (harmlessness) to a record that the presentation of evidence is no longer likely to affect.

Id. at 436. The Court quoted Justice Traynor for the proposition that

Whether or not counsel are helpful, it is still the responsibility of the . . . court, once it concludes there was error, to determine whether the error affected the judgment. It must do so without benefit of such aids as presumptions or allocated burdens of proof that expedite fact-finding at the trial.

Id. at 437 (citing R. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 26 (1970)). We find the Supreme Court's reasoning compelling and adopt this reasoning for application to Rule 44.2(b). We hold that it is the responsibility of the appellate court to assess harm after reviewing the record and that the burden to demonstrate whether the appellant was harmed by a trial court error does not rest on the appellant or the State.

Next we must address how a reviewing court determines whether a defendant was harmed when the trial court has erroneously denied one or more challenges for cause. As we explained above, substantial rights are affected when the error has a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict

THE RECORD FULLY DEMONSTRATES AN “ESSENCE OF MARY CANO” AS PER THE 13TH COURT APPEALS.

1. TEXAS AND FEDERAL LAW FIRMLY HOLD THAT THE TERM "PROSECUTION" ENCOMPASSES THE ENTIRE PROSECUTORIAL TEAM – NOT MERELY A CASE'S LEAD PROSECUTOR. IN REVIEWING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE STATE RECKLESSLY / BUREAUCRATICALLY WITHHELD EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE, THE 13^th COURT OF APPEALS FOCUSED SOLELY ON THE MENS REA OF THE STATE'S LEAD PROSECUTOR WITHOUT EXAMINING THE REMAINDER OF THE STATE'S PROSECUTION TEAM. DID THE COURT OF APPEALS IMPROPERLY FOCUS SOLELY ON THE CONDUCT OF THE LEAD PROSECUTOR IN HOLDING THAT TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY OVERULING APPELLANT’S AMENDED MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL?

2. THE RECORD FULLY DEMONSTRATES AN “ESSENCE OF MARY CANO” AS PER THE 13^TH COURT APPEALS. DID THE 13^TH COURT APPEALS ERR IN DECIDING ON “if the result of appellant's trial would have been different with Cano's testimony”. THE STATE'S PROSECUTION TEAM, ERRONEOUSLY AND REPEATEDLY WITHHOLD EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE, EXCULPATORY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, TWC Commission Policy AND PRECEDENT TOTAL PARTIAL UNEMPLOYMENT, DESPITE MULTIPLE REFERENCES TO MARY CANO’S POSITION FIRMLY ROOTED IN FEDERAL AND STATE LAW ”the Texas Workforce does not consider substitute teaching as employment”. DID THE 13^TH COURT OF APPEALS ERR BY IGNORING AND CONTRADICTING EXISTING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW?

3. DOES A PROSECUTOR HAVE A DUTY TO DISCLOSE ALL EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE UNDER BRADY V. MARYLAND WHEN THE DEFENDANT IS UNAWARE OF SPECIALIZED STATE AGENCY POLICY AND THE STATE AGENCY IS PART OF THE PROSECUTORIAL TEAM?

APPEALS POLICY AND PRECEDENT MANUAL

TOTAL AND PARTIAL UNEMPLOYMENT

TPU 105.00

TPU 105.00 CONTRACT OBLIGATION.
INCLUDES CASES IN WHICH THE CLAIMANT'S CONTRACTS
OR AGREEMENTS HAVE AN EFFECT ON DETERMINING HIS
UNEMPLOYMENT STATUS.

Appeal No. 82-4799-10-0782. Substitute teachers may have reasonable
assurance of continued employment within the meaning of
Section 3(f) (now codified as Section 207.041) of the Act. In determining
whether such reasonable assurance exists with regard to
substitute teachers, the following criteria should be utilized:
The school district must furnish to the Commission
written statements which provide facts that the substitute
teacher has been asked to continue in the
same capacity for the following academic year. Simply
placing the substitute teacher on a list for the following
year does not establish reasonable assurance.
It must be shown that both parties expect the relationship
to resume at the beginning of the following
year. The assurance must also be based on past experience
with regard to the number of substitutes
needed in the past.

DEAR PUBLIC POLICY MAKERS, JP COURTS HAVE GROWN WAY TOO BIG FOR THEIR BRITCHES

Google Yourself Corpus Christi: ... ROB EISSLER,, CHUY HINOJOSA, DAVID DEWHURST, KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, SOLOMON ORTIZ SR AND JP COURTS OF INJUSTICE

Justice of the Peace Courts' Jurisdiction in Criminal Proceedings "do not include confinement"

Dear State Representative Solomon P Ortiz Jr.,

As South Texas and HD #33 remain in anticipation of your response to the email communication regarding Texas Education Code 25.093 specifically and the Texas Education Code 25, another issue has been brought to my attention regarding the JP Courts Jurisdiction in Criminal Proceedings that are punishable by fine only

This is the preface of the JP Court illustrated below in the image entitled Court Structure of Texas according to The Official Website of Texas Courts

Court Structure of Texas

And also according to the The Handbook of Texas Online

Justice of the Peace Courts have jurisdiction over criminal offenses that are
punishable by fine only, and over civil cases in which the amount in
controversy is small (not more than $5,000 in 1995). 

CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

TITLE 1. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS

Art. 1.051. RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION BY COUNSEL.

(c)  An indigent defendant is entitled to have an attorney
appointed to represent him in any adversary judicial proceeding
that may result in punishment by confinement and in any other
criminal proceeding if the court concludes that the interests of
justice require representation.  Except as otherwise provided by
this subsection, if an indigent defendant is entitled to and
requests appointed counsel and if adversarial judicial proceedings
have been initiated against the defendant, a court or the courts'
designee authorized under Article 26.04 to appoint counsel for
indigent defendants in the county shall appoint counsel as soon as
possible, but not later than the end of the third working day after
the date on which the court or the courts' designee receives the
defendant's request for appointment of counsel.  In a county with a
population of 250,000 or more, the court or the courts' designee
shall appoint counsel as required by this subsection as soon as
possible, but not later than the end of the first working day after
the date on which the court or the courts' designee receives the
defendant's request for appointment of counsel.

Please note the limitation operatives under Art. 4.11
JURISDICTION OF JUSTICE (JP) COURTS.

"not consisting of confinement or imprisonment"

and

"do not include confinement"

CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

CHAPTER 4. COURTS AND CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

Art. 4.11. [60] [106] [96] JURISDICTION OF JUSTICE
COURTS.  (a) Justices of the peace shall have original jurisdiction
in criminal cases:
(1)  punishable by fine only or punishable by:                           
(A)  a fine;  and                                                        
(B)  as authorized by statute, a sanction not consisting of 
confinement or imprisonment;  or
(2)  arising under Chapter 106, Alcoholic Beverage Code,
that do not include confinement as an authorized sanction.
(b)  The fact that a conviction in a justice court has as a
consequence the imposition of a penalty or sanction by an agency or
entity other than the court, such as a denial, suspension, or
revocation of a privilege, does not affect the original
jurisdiction of the justice court.

Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722, eff. Jan. 1, 1966.
Amended by Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch. 108, Sec. 4, eff. Sept. 1,
1991;  Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 449, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1995;
1997, 75th Leg., ch. 533, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1997;  Acts 1997,
75th Leg., ch. 1013, Sec. 38, eff. Sept. 1, 1997.

However, the Justice Courts are punishing by confinement.

The Justice Courts are not appointing Attorneys for indigent defendants involved in adversarial judicial proceedings that are resulting in punishment by confinement.

In Nueces County, the Justice of the Peace Judges are not licensed

attorneys nor is the Justice Court a Court of Record Court.

A Court of Record is defined as:

A court in which the proceedings are recorded, transcribed, and maintained as permanent records.
brandonlclark.com/glossary.html

A court whose acts and proceedings are recorded and preserved.
www.courts.mo.gov/osca/index.nsf/0/8b69295b674dde2186256e15004ea27f

In common law jurisdictions, a court of record is a court that keeps permanent records of its proceedings. Judgments of a trial court of record are normally subject to appellate review. In many jurisdictions, all courts are courts of record. In many jurisdictions, courts that have the power to fine or imprison must be courts of record.
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Court_of_record

There is no recourse.

There is no accountability.

One other issue is the counting of a certain number of tardies as an absence and the absence is counted towards a truancy absence. There is not a provision for this illegal manipulation so as to prosecute. This prosecution under 25.093 and 25.094 can be easily proven if necessary.

To quote a Nueces County District Judge, "Justice Delayed is Justice Denied" as our HD #33 Representative we ask for emergency intervention and reform of this bad law. This is an appeal to you from South Texas. Do we really need to collect letters and signatures for our South Texas Delegation to take immediate action?

Respectfully,

Anton S Haley

Dear Texas Public Education Committee Chairman: the Honorable Rob Eissler,
Posted on February 18, 2007 at 00:50:12 AM by Jaime Kenedeno

Saturday, February 17, 2007
When a minor is allowed to run at large during the school day hours, It is irresponsible of the caretaker whose custody in which a child is placed

I am speaking to the distinguished Gentleman from Montgomery County,

The Honorable Rob Eissler,

It is expected, we demand it and we are very angry. We are Angry Parents and Children allover the Great State of Texas. We will bring Texas to your front porch should the ignorance continue. Start paying attention to the people, the families who are enduring the legislation mistakes created no doubt in good faith but have gone awry. Ask the South Texas Delegation about South Texas and they will tell you dont mess with South Texas and dont go against Los Kenedenos when they know and believe they are right and just in a cause. This is one of those causes. I promise.

Education is for our Children, our Youth, our Future. Children and Youth need constant redirection and set boundaries at home and at school as well. When a minor is allowed to run at large during the school day hours whether it is in the halls, leaving or returning a closed campus or simply unaccounted for is irresponsible of the caretaker whose custody in which he / she is placed. it is of the most primary of concerns to find out where the hell he is and where the hell he was and as a Principal / Educator it is happening on his watch. Fining parents who require their children to attend school is unjust and destructive; as they ENTRUST their children's direction well being and safety to the custody of a School Campus Administration.

http://robeissler.blogspot.com/2007/02/when-minor-is-allowed-to-run-at-large.html